[1]沈 怡,王新颖,陈海群.城市应急管理的委托-代理博弈[J].常州大学学报(自然科学版),2011,(02):63-66.
　SHEN Yi,WANG Xin-ying,CHEN Hai-qun.Principal-Agency Game in City Emergency Management[J].Journal of Changzhou University(Natural Science Edition),2011,(02):63-66.
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城市应急管理的委托-代理博弈()
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常州大学学报(自然科学版)[ISSN:2095-0411/CN:32-1822/N]

卷:
期数:
2011年02期
页码:
63-66
栏目:
环境科学与工程
出版日期:
2011-03-30

文章信息/Info

Title:
Principal-Agency Game in City Emergency Management
作者:
沈 怡; 王新颖; 陈海群
常州大学 环境与安全工程学院,江苏 常州 213164
Author(s):
SHEN Yi; WANG Xin-ying; CHEN Hai-qun
School of Environmental and Safety Engineering,Changzhou University,Changzhou 213164,China
关键词:
应急管理;  委托-代理;  激励;  博弈模型
Keywords:
emergency management;  principal-agency;  incentive;  game model
分类号:
X 924.4
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
随着社会的发展,城市发生突发公共事件的概率上升,完善应急管理系统的紧迫性越来越突出。通过制定合适的激励机制,建立城市应急管理的委托-代理博弈模型,将政府与社会团体及人群的应急管理工作量化,通过理论计算,得出效用期望集,政府根据期望集优化应急管理。博弈模型的应用不仅提高了政府的应急管理能力,还增加了社会团体及人群的工作积极性,实现了全民参与型的应急管理系统的建设。
Abstract:
With the social development, the probability of emergencyoccurrence in city would increase, which would make the perfection of emergencymanagement system more and more important. Through constituting incentive mechanism, building city emergency management system principal-agency game model, andquantifying the emergency management work of government, social groups and crowds, utility expectation set was obtained by theoretical calculation and was usedto optimize the city emergency management. The application of Game model not only improved the ability of the emergency management, but also increased the workenthusiasm of social groups and crowds, which implemented the construction of public participation in the emergency management system.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
作者简介:沈怡(1985-),女,江苏太仓人,硕士生; 通讯联系人:陈海群。
更新日期/Last Update: 2011-03-30